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Developments in Russia 
[21(2) European Public Law (2015) 229-238] 
Jane HENDERSON

 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There have been a number of significant developments in Russian public law since the last 
report in 2011; I believe five call for mention in this survey. In chronological order these are: 
1. increase in the terms of office of the President and the elected legislative chamber, the 
State Duma; 2. resolution of the ‘turf war’ between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Court over powers to declare legislation unconstitutional; 3. creation of a new Supreme Court 
of the Russian Federation to replace the previous Supreme Court and Highest Arbitrazh 
(Commercial) Court; 4. changes (yet again) to the rules for the election of deputies to the 
State Duma; and 5. expansion of the Russian Federation by the inclusion of two new 
Federation subjects. Assessment of which of these changes will have most significance in the 
long run is beyond the powers of this rapporteur, but the totality indicates that Russia is (yet 
again) in the state of transition and flux. 
 
2 INCREASE IN TERMS OF OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND STATE DUMA 
 
When the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation (RF) was adopted,
1
 the term of office 
for the President was set in Article 81(1) as 4 years (replacing the 5 years under the previous 
legislation for which Yeltsin was elected in 1991 as the first Russian President). Article 96 
defined the period for which State Duma deputies were elected also to be 4 years.
2
 
Unfortunately, this resulted in an extended period of electioneering every 4 years, when 
deputies (existing and potential) gave all their energies to campaigning for December Duma 
elections, and then supporting candidates for the presidential elections the following March. 
The decision was therefore taken to ‘uncouple’ the two sets of elections and in December 
2008, during the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev, amendments to the Constitution were 
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successfully adopted to change both time periods.
3
 The revised terms of office, to apply from 
the next election, were set as six years for the President and five years for the Duma deputies. 
The existing provision that the same individual may not serve as President more than two 
terms in succession was retained (Article 81(3), emphasis added).  
 Despite the stringent requirements necessary for adoption of any constitutional 
amendment, the process was impressively smooth.
4
 Changes to the Duma electoral rules had 
resulted in the Duma elected in 2007 being composed entirely from party lists on the basis of 
proportional representation, with a 7 per cent threshold. Only four parties gained seats and the 
so-called ‘party of power’, Unified Russia (Edinaia Rossiia, sometimes translated as ‘United 
Russia’) had 70 per cent of them. Unified Russia had been created in 2001 with the specific 
aim of giving support to President Putin,
5
 and when Putin stood down after serving his two 
four-year terms as President, Unified Russia gave allegiance to Medvedev, his chosen heir, 
who stood for President in March 2008 (with a campaign promise that Vladimir Putin would 
be his Prime Minister).  Medvedev therefore had no difficulty in getting the required two-
thirds majority vote in the Duma for the proposed reforms, and received similar support in the 
second chamber, the Federation Council, where a three-quarters majority was needed. 
Unified Russia had also done well in elections to regional legislatures, so the requirement of 
approval of the proposed constitutional amendments by legislatures in two-thirds of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation did not provide any hindrance either.  
 The new time periods operated from the December 2011 Duma election and March 
2012 presidential election. Since then, the two elections will not coincide for 30 years. Of 
course, mathematically adept readers will immediately be aware that changing just one of the 
terms of office would have broken the link; the motivation behind extending both has not 
been made clear. However circumstances raise the suspicion that Medvedev’s reforms may 
have been for Putin’s benefit, especially in the light of the decision presented on 24 
September 2011 by Putin to Unified Russia’s congress that he and not Medvedev would be 
the forthcoming presidential candidate, despite Medvedev being eligible to stand for a second 
term.
6
 At least amongst the educated, urban, intelligentsia or ‘creative classes’, the perceived 
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cynicism of this so-called castling arrangement (named after the chess move under European 
chess rules, whereby the King and rook make a simultaneous strategic move) fuelled anger 
which then manifested in street demonstrations following the December 2011 Duma 
elections, where electoral fraud was apparently rife.
7
 
 The reforms mean that Vladimir Putin, who returned to presidential office in May 
2012 after winning the March election, has the possibility of twelve years from then at the 
helm, assuming a successful re-election in 2018 and no personal health issues. Neither of 
these two factors may be taken for granted; a drop in world oil prices combined with the 
impact of Western sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014 may 
adversely affect the Russian standard of living and hence dent Putin’s popularity, and the 
physical impact of some of his exploits may take their toll on his well-being.
8
  
 
3 RESOLUTION OF THE “TURF WAR”  
 
For a number of years there had been an unfortunate disagreement between the (previous) 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court over who may decide whether a law is 
unconstitutional.
9
 The root of the dispute was inconsistent legislation. On the one hand, the 
Constitution itself says that it has ‘highest legal force, [and] direct effect … Laws and other 
legal acts… must not be contrary to the Constitution’ (Article 15 (1)). On this basis, in 1995 
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the Supreme Court Plenum told the judges subordinate to it in the domestic court hierarchy 
that they had the power to disapply any unconstitutional law. On the other hand, the 1994 
Federal Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court RF says a judge in an ordinary court, 
faced with facts which require the application of legislation thought by the judge to be 
unconstitutional, ‘may’ refer that issue to the Constitutional Court.10 If the Constitutional 
Court then deems the law unconstitutional, it may not be applied by any court. The wording 
of the 1994 Federal Constitutional was deliberately vague, saying ‘may’ rather than ‘must’.11 
However, in June 1998 the Constitutional Court declared that referral to it was mandatory. 
The Supreme Court did not concede. There was a ‘stand-off’; domestic court judges 
continued to disapply legislation they believed unconstitutional, although their individual 
actions had no precedential effect. Only the Constitutional Court could render legislation 
generally inapplicable. ‘This discrepancy between two jurisdictions lasted fifteen years’.12  
Now the situation has been resolved by the Supreme Court acceding to the 
Constitutional Court’s view. It issued a ruling on 16 April 2013 which amended its 1995 
Plenum ruling cited above.  
 This volte face came a few months before a response by the Russian Constitutional 
Court in another ongoing dispute, between it and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The Russian Constitutional Court has declared itself reluctant to apply caselaw 
from the ECtHR, if Russia had not been a party. Crystallizing that view, the Constitutional 
Court issued a ruling in December 2013, in which it ‘expressly has forbidden Russian courts 
from implementing allegedly unconstitutional judgments of the ECtHR and, also, has barred 
these courts from assessing the constitutionality of Russian legislation which is applied in 
such cases.’13 In that ruling the Constitutional Court ‘confirmed its triumph over the RF 
Supreme Court’.14  
Clarity is to be welcomed, although not at the expense of the Constitution’s status as a 
directly applicable legal document. Also, it may be doubted whether the Constitutional Court 
will be able to cope with the flood of referrals. Since reforms of June 2009, the Constitutional 
Court only sits in plenary session so is limited to hearing one case at a time (under the 1994 
legislation as originally enacted, it could sit in two Chambers). The number of cases the 
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Constitutional Court can hear each year is inevitably limited, while the volume of potentially 
unconstitutional legislation is vast. Channelling decision-making on the issue solely to the 
Constitutional Court may well create a significant backlog, or induce judges in the other court 
to turn a blind eye to apparent breaches of the Constitution by applicable legislation, rather 
than have the inevitable delay caused by sending a reference to the Constitutional Court.  
 
4 CREATION OF A NEW SUPREME COURT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
 
On 21 June 2013 ITAR-TASS news agency reported that President Putin had announced at a 
plenary session of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum that he proposed to put 
forward legislation to unite the Supreme Court and the Highest Arbitrazh Court.
15
 This was a 
great surprise. Some commentators saw it as part of a political battle between the (old) 
Chairman of the Supreme Court, Viacheslav Lebedev, and the (comparatively young, and 
friend of Medvedev) Chairman of the Highest Arbitrazh Court, Anton Ivanov.
16
 Deep 
scepticism was expressed at Putin’s idea, with few commentators thinking it would improve 
the quality of justice. For example, Alexei Yelayev, a member of the Russian 
Lawyers’ Union, rounded off his Weekly Report with the following: 
 
The reason why there are no comments is that non-specialists do not understand 
anything in it and specialists apparently think the person who proposed this is mad, or, 
if they choose to be loyal to the current administration, write articles justifying the 
brilliant idea of the Kremlin speechwriter.
17
 
 
However, despite some lobbying against the reform, it was carried through. As with the 2008 
constitutional amendments discussed above, compliant federal and regional legislatures 
ensured that the procedural hoops were smoothly jumped. On 5 February 2014, the 
Constitution was amended and a new Federal Constitutional Law passed with the effect of 
dissolving the existing Supreme Court and Highest Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court and setting 
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up a new Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. As well as the Constitution, another 28 
legislative acts needed to be amended.
18
  
One ancillary change is that, although it will retain an office in Moscow, from 2017 
the new Supreme Court RF will have its main base to St. Petersburg.
19
 The Constitutional 
Court moved there from Moscow in 2008; this caused serious disruption. It is to be hoped 
that lessons have been learned, so that there is no similar hiatus in the Supreme Court’s 
functioning.  
The lower level arbitrazh courts as separate specialist courts have been retained, to 
the relief of those opposed to the reform. Under Ivanov’s chairmanship, the Highest 
Arbitrazh Court and the arbitrazh courts it supervised had gained a reputation for fairness and 
transparency. There had been fear that these positive features would be diluted by a complete 
merger with the ordinary domestic courts, whose reputation is less respected.
20
 
The new Supreme Court is to be composed of 170 judges, selected by a special 
qualifications collegium (board), with 27 members, that is: a representative of the President, 
the Public Chamber, and the national public associations of lawyers, with the remaining 
members elected by the councils of judges of the Russian regions. Controversially, tenure of 
former Supreme Court and Highest Arbitrazh Court judges ended with the demise of those 
courts, and individuals had to be approved by the new qualification collegium, if they wished 
to sit in the new Supreme Court. Anyone with relatives abroad (particularly if they had taken 
foreign nationality) was ineligible.
21
 At least seven of the most experienced Supreme 
Arbitrazh Court judges resigned when the bill to reform their court was presented to the State 
Duma by the Presidential Administration, preferring retirement to the indignity of re-
attestation .
22
 
The new Supreme Court began work on 6 August 2014, after a six-month transition 
period during which jurisdiction was transferred. Its full complement of 170 judges was not 
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yet in post (only just over 90).
23
  It has a Plenum, a Presidium and seven chambers (collegia): 
criminal, civil, administrative, economic, military, as well as a judicial disciplinary chamber
24
 
and an appellate chamber.
25
  
 A couple of months earlier, in a closed door session, the special qualifications 
collegium had recommended for appointment as Chair of the new Court Viacheslav Lebedev, 
who had been the Chair of the previous Supreme Court since 1989.
26
 RIA Novosti reported 
on 21 May that he had been duly appointed by the second chamber of the legislature, the 
Federation Council, on the President’s nomination, following the special qualifications 
collegium’s positive recommendation.27 Under Article 12 of the new Federal Constitutional 
Law on the Supreme Court RF, Lebedev’s appointment as Chair is for six years, with the 
possibility of unlimited renewals. Lebedev’s was born in 1943, the same year as the 
incumbent Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin. Under current legislation, 
the usual judicial retirement age of 70 does not apply to either of these Court Chairman. For 
the time being, at least, President Putin seems happy to keep continuity in these two highest 
judicial offices, as did Medvedev before him. 
 
5  RETURN TO MIXED SYSTEM OF STATE DUMA DEPUTY ELECTIONS 
 
In December 2011, President Medvedev responded to the street demonstrations following the 
‘stolen’ Duma elections28 with a number of promises of reform, including a return to half the 
Duma deputies being directly elected from constituencies. He did not manage to fulfil this 
particular promise, but his successor Putin did. On 24 February 2014 Putin signed into force 
a new ‘Federal Law On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly 
of the Russian Federation’.29 Under this, there is a return to a mixed system for Duma deputy 
elections, whereby half will be elected on a first past the post basis in single-mandate 
electoral districts (one deputy per district) while the other half will be elected based on the 
proportion of nationwide votes given to political parties listed on the ballot paper, with a 
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threshold of 5 per cent (Article 88(7) and (8)). The law also establishes the procedures for 
nominating candidates, both directly and through the party lists, and the procedures for 
registering candidates for the single-mandate electoral districts and parties for the party lists 
and the rules for creating electoral funds. 
 In a separate development, on 14 February 2014 the State Duma passed a law 
disqualifying those convicted of serious crimes from running for governorships or 
the Russian presidency.
30
 
 
The measure… restricts the electoral eligibility of those who commit serious and very 
serious crimes for periods of 10 and 15 years, respectively. … Ex-prisoners had 
previously been completely banned from running for office, though the Constitutional 
Court ruled that a lifetime ban was unconstitutional last year.
31
 
 
Although this reform therefore sounds like an improvement on the previous situation, it was 
adopted in the context of what appeared to be a staged fraud prosecution the previous year of 
a leading opposition figure, Alexei Navalny, after he had made it clear he had presidential 
aspirations. Although Navalny’s five-year imprisonment term was suspended, the 
disqualification law prohibits him from being a presidential candidate until 2030. It is feared 
that it might prove too tempting to those in power to induce ‘prosecutions to order’ to 
eliminate potential rivals, especially in the circumstances where the allocation of cases in 
court can be controlled by supportive judicial chair men and women.
32
 
 
6 EXPANSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
 
Finally, we will note that on 18 March 2014 two more federal subjects – the Republic of 
Crimea and the city of federal significance Sevastopol – were added to the 83 which formed 
the Russian Federation at that time. The process followed the 2001 Federal constitutional law 
‘On the procedure of acceptance into the Russian Federation and formation within its 
competence of a new subject of the Russian Federation’.33 Russian’s Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Lavrov, explained to the State Duma on 20 March 2014: 
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The decision about the acceptance of the Republic of Crimea into the Russian 
Federation is based on the free will of the multinational people of Crimea during the 
referendum of the 16 March. This decision corresponds to international law, including 
the principle of the sovereign equality of state and the right of people to self-
determination, which is stated as a goal of the UN in its Charter. 
As a result of the referendum and on the basis of the Declaration of 
Independence of the Republic of Crimea of 17 March, the Supreme Council of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea proclaimed Crimea an independent, sovereign state 
and turned to Russia proposing for it to accept the Republic of Crimea into Russia. 
On the 18 March, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, signed the Decree 
about the recognition of the Republic of Crimea. According to the Federal 
Constitutional Law "On the Procedure of Acceptance into the Russian Federation and 
Creation within it of a new constituent entity of the Russian Federation", the President 
of Russia notified the Council of the Federation, the State Duma and the Government 
about the proposition of the Republic of Crimea and signed the Agreement presented 
for your consideration, with this state. 
According to the established procedure, the Constitutional Court of Russia 
verified the Agreement for its compliance with the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation and gave a positive opinion. 
This Agreement legally formalizes the accession of the Republic of Crimea 
into Russia, as well as envisaging the creation of new constituent entities of the 
Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol.
34
 
 
Thus, from the Russian perspective, the return of Crimea to Russia after an absence of 60 
years (having previously been part of the Russian Empire since at least 1783) has been 
carried out perfectly lawfully. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
This report has touched on a number of events, but has perforce only given a brief account; 
the tip of the iceberg for each. In the very few years since the last Report was published, there 
has been a marked change in the orientation of both Russia’s internal and external affairs. 
However, it seems impossible at the current time to give an assessment of the long-term 
impact of this new situation. Current Kreminologists have been complaining that Russia’s 
direction of development is unclear.
35
 There is clearly a new reset in the relations between 
Russia and its near and not so near neighbours. There may also be some second thoughts as to 
Russia’s willingness to accept a western view of rule of law. Within Russia there are 
unresolved political questions and an increasing economic uncertainty, which may prove to 
bea toxic mix. We will continue to monitor future developments, but with a degree of 
apprehension almost unprecedented in the last quarter century. 
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